Abstract. We present architecture for a relying-party to manage credentials, and in particular to map different credentials into common format and semantics. This will allow use of simple, widely available credentials as well as more advanced credentials such as public key certificates, attribute certificates and `Negative` credentials (which result in reduced trust) such as certificate revocation lists (CRL). The core of the architecture is a Credential Manager who collects credentials, and maps them to common format and semantics.
Introduction
Trust and assessment of quality and qualifications are critical for secure business and commerce. A relying party decides whom to trust, and estimates quality, by direct evaluation and inspection, and by credentials from third parties. A credential is an assertion by an issuer of some attributes of the subject of the credential. Credentials may include reviews, recommendations, certifications, historical records, and so on. It is up to the relying party to interpret the credentials, and in particular, some credentials may result in reduced trust or quality assessment. Indeed, some credentials may assert `negative` attributes of their subject, e.g. a convictions record. The relying party should also validate the authenticity of the credential, e.g. by checking a digital signature over it; notice that the security mechanism used to authenticate the credential (e.g. signature) is not a part of the credential itself. In this broad interpretation, credentials form the basis for many business (and private) processes. Most of these processes are manual, and based on physical (paper) credentials.
With the growth of electronic commerce, relying parties often want to make trust and quality decisions using automated systems (programs), with electronic credentials. Many systems use only very simple forms of electronic credentials, such as the result of a lookup in a database kept by the issuer, based on user-id/password identification. However, it is well recognized that digitally signed credentials such as public key certificates, attribute certificates and certificate revocation lists are essential for more efficient and secure electronic commerce.
In this work, we propose that the relying party uses a credential management module or service, to collect all credentials and map them into common format and type (semantic attributes). The credentials may be of different kinds and numerous
• Collecting credentials from different sources, using multiple protocols.
• Mapping multiple formats of credentials into a simple common format and interface.
• Extraction, from credentials, of the semantics relevant and understood by the relying party applications.
• Credential management, including storage, updates and revocation checking
In order to simplify and focus on a credential management, our work does not address the actual authentication and identification of the requesting party, and in particular, we do not discuss how to confirm that the requesting party is the subject of specific credentials. This confirmation is necessary, to prevent against a corrupted party making a request, with credentials belonging to a more trusted or reliable party. When the credential include the public key of the subject, such confirmation can be easily done over an insecure network, by checking for digital signature on the request or using an authenticated channel such as TLS/SSL or IPSEC [16, 26, 27] . When a human, physically adjacent to secure confirmation facilities, makes a request, the credential may identify its subject by biometrics (picture, fingerprint, etc.) or by name or identifier in conjunction with identity card or device. This confirmation is outside the scope of this paper. We present only high-level architecture of the credential manager. We expect follow up work to transform this high level architecture into practical, widely accepted and standardized framework.
Identifiers, names and keys in credentials
There is a lot of confusion and controversy about identifiers in credentials (and certificates). Following [21] , we find it useful to distinguish between two kinds of identifiers: names and keys, as they serve two related but different purposes:
• A name allows the Relying party to identify other references to the same subject, using the same name, in credentials or databases. The relying party may also remember the name for possible future reference, e.g. to create historical records or to sue the subject. The name may have legal or human-recognizable meaning, such as registered name, official company name, or logotype [30, 31] . Names should be uniquely resolvable, to make sure that all references are to the same subject. However, the same subject can have multiple names (often of different types).
• A key is a value that allows the relying party to directly identify the subject of the credential or a message coming from the subject. In particular, a public key of the subject in a credential (certificate) is a key, as it allows the relying party to validate the subject's signature on a request or to identify the subject by sending it an encrypted challenge. A picture or fingerprint is also a key, as the relying party can use them to identify the subject by direct observations (biometric identification). A key is supposed to be unique to the subject (to allow identification), therefore some keys can also be used as a name (e.g. when appearing in multiple credentials).
Identity public key certificates bind between a key (public key) and the subject name (sometimes also alternate names).
Every name should have well defined interpretation and in particular be from a welldefined set. In X.509 certificates names are usually specified in the Distringuished Name field, and/or in the SubjectAltName extension. Names can be from a `flat` global namespace, such as social security number. More often, names are defined by specifying a namespace and a particular name within that namespace. In particular, X.509 Distinguished Names are built as a sequence of `relative distinguished names`, gradually focusing from a global namespace to a particular namespace, and the last relative distinguished name assumed unique within the last namespace (e.g. C=US/L=NY/O=NYPD/OU=SOHO/CN=John Doe). The names in SPKI consist of a namespace followed an identifier, where the namespace is identified by a key or by a (shorter) SPKI name.
Credential attributes and types
In simple scenarios, credential issuers are closely coordinated with credential relying applications, and the applications can use the credential directly. This may be achieved by standardizing the credentials. This is done in the PKIX standards for public key certificates [11] , which define exact certificate format with exact encoding (both based on [18] ) and specific ways for encoding identifiers and attributes in the certificates. We comment that the usage of PKIX is still quite complex, in particular since there are multiple ways to specify attributes -as fields, attributes of the subject's Distinguished Name field, extensions, privileges within extensions, and more. Furthermore, [11] sometimes permits the same attribute to be specified in multiple locations. For example, the e-mail address of the subject may be specified as attribute EmailAddress of the subject distinguished name, although the standard specifies that in new implementations the e-mail address must be specified as rfc822Name in the subject alternative name field. As a result, even when the credential issuers and credential relying applications use the same exact standard for credentials, there may be substantial complexity in processing the attributes in the credential due to potential ambiguity and alternative mappings, as well as to having some attributes as fields, some as attributes, some as extensions, and so on. The credential manager maps all the attributes to a simple, uniform structure, simplifying the relying applications.
In many realistic scenarios, a credential relying application may need to be able to handle credentials from multiple issuers -possibly even for the same subject. The different issuers may use slightly or dramatically different credential formats. Consider even a very basic case of two issuers using PKIX X.509 certificates, but with different private extensions, usage of options, or semantic meanings as defined in the Certificates Policy Statement (CPS) [10] . It is quite possible that the two certificates actually carry the same semantic attributes, however they are encoded differently. We say that the two certificates are of different type 1 . A credential type identifies a particular set of attributes as well as their precise semantic meanings. The Credential Framework that we offer provides a general mechanism for mapping between compatible credential types. Even if used simply to implement the CPS mappings defined by the PIKS and X.509 standards, this will already remove complexity from the relying applications.
In order to identify which mapping should be used, it is easier if the credential type is known. We consider credentials with an explicitly known type, and credentials where the type is not known. When the type is not known, the framework will attempt to identify the type; afterwards, it will use mappings among identified credential types. The framework will also provide the type identifier to the relying application in a standard way, which will make it easier for the application to use multiple credential types.
The use of credentials from multiple potential issuers, for the same subject or for different subjects, may be further complicated if the credentials may use different formats. As mentioned above, credentials may be, in addition to public key certificates, also attribute certificates, revocations, or other credentials such a PICS [13] rating or a record from a database (e.g. the Dun and Bradstreet record returned by Eccelerate [3] ). Furthermore, there are multiple formats for public key certificates, ranging from different X.509 extensions, to completely different certificate formats such as PGP, SPKI, PolicyMaker and KeyNote. The framework maps different credential formats to one common and simple format.
Related Works
The most well-known and deployed approach to public key infrastructure is the X.509 standard [18] , recently revised and extended [19] . The X.509 approach focus on identity based public key certificates. It assumes a universal convention for selecting distinguished names (DN), which are unique identifiers based on the subject name. The distinguished names consist of several components or attributes, one of them being the common name -which would typically be the first, middle and last name of the subject (if a person). The other components of the distinguished name should ensure uniqueness, as common names are clearly not unique. Notice that this requires careful selection of the other identifiers in the distinguished name, and in fact in many implementations some of the common name entries had to be artificially modified to ensure that the distinguished name will be unique, resulting in common names like John Smith1.
A bigger problem with the traditional X.509 approach results from the implicit requirement that a certificate issuer is responsible for correct identification, with potential liability for damages from wrong identification [5] . This became a concern, and indeed many companies refrained from issuing certificates (e.g. to employees). Attribute certificates [19, 6, 12] provides a mechanism to provide a credential by referring to a public key certificate, thereby allowing a company to at least issue a credential (attribute certificate), using public key certificate issued by some other CA. However, the introduction of attribute authorities introduces additional complexity to the relying party, even if using only X.509 certificates, since now attributes of the subject are defined in both attribute certificates as well as in (multiple parts of) public key certificates. Our approach could be used to help simplify the use of X.509 certificates, as well as to allow support for additional forms of credentials Recent works, in particular [1, 2, 15, 4] , introduce new formats for public key certificates. These works do not propose methods to deal with different credential (and certificate) formats, therefore, our work is complementary. Two other important differences: these works consider only public-key certificates, not general credentials; and their certificates contain authorization information (which operations are allowed to the subject), while we define credentials as containing simply attributes asserted by the issuers. This last difference is more conceptual than technical, since clearly one can encode permissions in a certificate field for attributes and vice verse.
Part of the motivation of [1, 2, 15, 4] is to change the X.509 naming mechanisms. They suggest that names should only be unique with respect to a given issuer, and do not necessarily have to have global meaning (and therefore liability). In fact, in this approach the name field in a certificate becomes just a convenience and an option, and the subject is really identified by possessing the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.
Another problem with traditional X.509 approach lies with the implicit assumption that there exist a hierarchy of certificate (and attribute) authorities, and relying parties know and trust the root CA of this hierarchy. A very different approach is taken by PGP [22] , where certificates define a `web of trust` and there is no central CA. We share the view advocated by many [22, 4, 5, 9, 15, 1, 2, 14, 7, 17, 8, 12, 32, 33] , that a relying party may not necessarily completely trust the issuers of the credentials. Instead, these works advocate a model where the relying application may need multiple credentials to make its decisions, and has a non-trivial policy for the necessary credentials. Our work is a follow-up to our work in [17, 8, 24] , where we developed tools and algorithms to determine if a subject has the right set of credentials (from properly trusted issuers) according to a given policy.
In an earlier version of this paper [28] we introduced a simple XML syntax for credentials. In this version, we show how encode credentials using the SAML syntax [29] , which is in advanced stages of definition. The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML-based syntax for specifying security assertions about subjects. A SAML assertion can contain information about authentication of the subject, authorization decision (whether the subject is allowed certain operation on resources), and attributes (attributes) of subjects. Credentials, as we defined them, are assertions by the issuer only about attributes of the subject. Our assertions therefore do not include authentication and authorization information. The SAML effort does not address the credential management issues addressed by the architecture in this paper.
Relying Party Credential Management Architecture
We propose that the relying party use architecture as illustrated in Figure 1 below. The core module is the Credential Manager. The manager receives requests for resolving credentials from the appropriate module of the relying party (either directly from the relying application, or from the trust management or access control modules). The request includes an identifier of the subject, instructions on where to search for credentials, and optionally an initial credential(s), e.g. a public key certificate. The initial credentials are typically received from with some request (e.g. connection). The Credential Manager is not concerned with validating that the requestor has the right to the credentials -that should be validated thru independent means, such as validating a digital signature on the request, or authenticating the requestor e.g. using SSL. After the credential relying application receives the credentials collected and processed by the credential manager, it may submit another request to the credential manager, e.g. searching for credentials of an issuer of some of the credentials returned by the credentials manager.
Request
Or In a typical Web deployment, a request is received at the (web) server from a client. If SSL client authentication is used, the server will receive a certificate from the client 2 , otherwise the server may receive some other identifier for the client (e.g. user name and/or e-mail address 3 ), and potentially a password. The Credential Manager is called with the received identifier and credential (certificate).
The Credential Manager has three main modules and functions:
• The collector collects (additional) relevant credentials. In many cases, the requesting party may not present all of his credentials together with the request. In others, the relying party is evaluating the credentials for another party on its own initiative, without receiving a request (e.g. when the relying party wants to contact one of list of potential partners). In particular, in the typical case when the subject is authenticated using SSL or TLS client or server authentication [16, 27] , then only one certificate (chain) is sent from the subject to the relying party performing the authentication. Furthermore, there may be credentials that the subject may not even be aware of (e.g. review by a referee trusted by the relying party), or `negative` credentials, providing unfavorable statements and attributes, that the subject may not willingly disclose. The collector module of the credential manager will automatically collect such missing credentials as described below. The collector also performs two related administrative functions:
• Check for revocations of credentials. Many types of credentials may be revoked or modified. Certainly, the subject cannot be trusted to provide information on revocations or (disadvantageous) modifications to its credentials.
• Cache credentials to speed up processing. To improve efficiency, the collector module of the credential manager may store received credentials, checking for updates.
• The format converter converts all the credentials into simple, uniform format.
This allows credential relying applications to be oblivious to the specific format and even method of a credential. For example, the logic in an e-marketplace application which deals with a membership request may only care if the subject is an employee of a member company, but not if this information was received by a public key certificate, by an attribute certificate, by e-mail to the company or by a direct query. In a previous version of this paper [28] we defined such a simple XML syntax; in the current version we use the recently published Secure Assertion Markup Language, SAML [29] .
• The semantics converter converts the attributes in the credentials to these known to the relying application. This includes removing irrelevant attributes, renaming attributes, changing scales (e.g. to metric scale), and removing credentials which have unknown attributes marked critical.
We describe each of the modules of the credential manager in the following sections.
Credential Collector
The first operation of the credential manager is to collect credentials for the subject. The credential collector module handles this, upon receiving a request from the relying application. The request indicates the subject (and possibly one or more known credentials for it), list of repositories to be searched for credentials, and options. The options include maximal time for cached credentials, maximal number of credentials, and limits on the issuers and types of credentials.
To collect credentials, the Credential Collector will contact one or several credential collector adapters, or simply adapters, as illustrated in Figure 2 below (additional collectors may be needed for other protocols and repositories). The Credential Manager uses a table it maintains mapping repositories to available adapters. For performance, it also uses a local cache of credentials, subject to the options in the request. Request (subject, options, repositories, credentials)
Response (credentials, as XML/SAML documents)
Figure 2: Credential Collector Module
Adapters may use different mechanisms appropriate to collect different kinds of credentials, from different sources. Some of these are:
• Adapters are likely to request public key and attribute certificates from a repository identified by the subject and given in the request to the Credential Manager, and / or from predefined central repositories.
• Adapters may try to collect credentials from central repositories, which keep credentials for many entities. This approach is needed whenever the subject may be unaware of the credential, and even more if the credential is `negative` -such as a certificate revocation list or an unfavorable product review. As described in [14] , this approach is also useful to find a chain of certificates (or credentials) from the issuers trusted by the relying party to the issuers of credentials to the subject.
• Adapters may try to collect credentials using general-purpose search engines, for credentials that will have well defined and accepted format. This is particularly useful for negative credentials.
• Adapters may use predefined gateways to provide credentials. A typical role for a gateway may be to provide interface to a database, using a public key certificate that includes an identifier of an entry in the database. In this case, the client is authenticated using a public key certificate (e.g. using SSL/TLS). Then, the certificate, or just the identifier, is sent (by the collector) to the gateway. The gateway performs an appropriate query on a database, using the identifier, and returns the record. This mechanism is used by eccelerate.com to provide subject records from Dun & Bradstreet's database [3] .
• Adapters may contact a server for the subject using secure mechanisms, providing the subject identifier, and receive back the credentials of that subject. To limit exposure of the credentials, the subject may provide the relying party with a password necessary to receive the credentials from the server. A `use once` password is also possible, which will be used only for the specific transaction, and communicated securely between the subject and her server. A `use once` password may be sent by the adapter or received by the adapter from the server, in which case it is returned to the relying party application (which should then use it to authenticate the request).
All adapters encode the credentials they collected in a general XML document syntax, to allow uniform processing of the credentials. In the next section we discuss possible encoding, in particular using the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML [29] ), and possible automated conversion tools that further simplify the processing of the collected credentials.
Credentials Encoding and Conversions
The conversion of credentials is the central service of the Credential Manager. The conversion receives credentials with different formats and types, and makes them all available via a common, simplified interface, also mapping them to the types known to the credential relying application. See The conversion consists of two stages, each in separate module: the format converter and the semantic converter. The format converter receives credentials in different formats, encoded as stings in a simple document format; it seems reasonable for this format to be the same as the detailed credential format, e.g. using the same (subset of) SAML [29] , but with the entire input credential (in different formats) encoded as a string. The format converter performs the mostly `mechanical` transformation of extracting the attributes from the credentials and encoding them as SAML (XML) elements, to simplify further processing. There is very limited significance to the particular format (we used a different format in [28] ).
The second stage is the semantic converter; it focuses on extracting the attributes and credential type meaningful to the relying application. In the next section we explain how we use the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), and in the following sections we describe the format converter and the semantic converter.
Credential Content and Encoding
Our goal is to automatically process and handle a large variety of different credential types. For that, we identify the different fields which are relevant to any credential, and define generic encoding for credentials with these fields. Different encodings may be used with the architecture; to illustrate, we suggest how each field may be encoded using the SAML [29] <Assertion> element (in earlier version we used different encoding [28] ). Below we list the different fields and suggestions for their encoding:
• Type and attributes -this field contains the attributes (properties) which the credential asserts for the subject, and the type or format of the credential. The credential type, when known, defines the expected attributes in the credential. The credential type also defines the meaning of attributes (unless they are from a more general namespace, used by multiple credential types). When the credential is in some non-SAML format, and its exact type and attributes are not yet determined, this field includes the format by name (e.g. 'PKIX' or 'SPKI') and there is only one attribute, including the entire credential (in standard textual encoding). Suggested SAML encoding: encode the attributes and credential type using SAML <AttributeStatement> element. This element will contain one or more <Attribute> elements. For credentials imported from different formats, there will be an <Attribute> element with attributes AttributeNamespace= 'Formats', AttributeName as the name of the format, e.g. AttributeName= 'PKIX', and <AttributeValue> element containing the imported credential as a string. If the imported credential is in XML, then the <AttributeValue> can contain it directly as XML element . If the credential type is known, there will be an <Attribute> element with attributes AttributeNamespace= 'Type' and the type of the credential as the value of the attribute AttributeName, e.g. AttributeName= 'Rating' (and no <AttributeValue> element). The other <Attribute> elements will contain the different attributes, with the appropriate AttributeNamespace (often the credential type).
• Subject -the subject of the credential. The Subject field can contain one or more names and/or keys for the subject. Suggested SAML encoding: encode the subject name(s) and key(s) used to confirm its identity, using one or more SAML <Subject> element(s). This element already contains appropriate sub-elements for subject name and key, namely <NameIdentifier> and <SubjectConfirmation>, respectively. • Issuer key (credential confirmation method) -the key with which the credential was verified (typically the public key of the issuer or its hash). Suggested SAML encoding: SAML does not include a natural element for this value. However, SAML allows arbitrary extensions in the <Statement> element, and it suggested to use such an extension to define an <Issuer> element similar to the <Subject> element (defined in SAML). A natural way to add the issuer key is to place it in <IssuerConfirmation> element within <Issuer> element, defined like the <SubjectConfirmation> element (which is in SAML, placed in the <Subject> element).
• Issuer name -this is the name of the issuer, allowing search for credentials for the issuer by name (but these credentials must also include the Issuer key to be safely associated with the same issuer). Suggested SAML encoding: SAML defines an Issuer mandatory attribute to the <Assertion> element, designated for the name of the issuer. Therefore, whenever a well-defined string representation for the name is available, it should be placed in the Issuer attribute of <Assertion>. However, a more natural place would be in a <NameIdentifier> element within the <Issuer> element discussed above. This would also allow support for multiple names and name formats.
• Capture and conversions history -identifies the procedure(s) used to capture the credential, i.e. how it was received (e.g. certificate received from web server using SSL, or query against a database). Also lists the procedures used to convert the credential from its initial type to its present type. The capture and conversion history field may be used, for example, to avoid an unreliable conversion. Suggested SAML encoding: SAML does not include a natural element for this value. One possible encoding is as an additional extended <Statement> element, and another is to specify the capture and conversion history as part of the <IssuerConfirmation> element.
The Format Converter
The Format Converter is a module that accepts different credential formats and converts them into a common interface, e.g. to the SAML format. More precisely, the input to the Format Converter is a simple SAML document, which contains a single attribute whose name is the format of the credential and whose value is the credential (in that non-SAML format). The Format Converter will invoke a format converter module to extract the SAML-defined attributes from the credential, using one of the available modules (from different formats). New format converter modules may be added to support additional and new credential formats. See Figure 4 . Some credentials are composed by standard encoding of a certain format. Examples of popular encodings are BER and DER (typically used to encode X.509 certificates) and BASE64 (used to provide printable encoding for different content), In this case, the Format Converter may first remove the encoding. For example consider a BER (Basic Encoding Rule) encoded PKIX X.509 certificate which is given as input to the format converter, as in Figure 6 . BER encoding is the standard encoding for ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation One), the syntax for X509v3 certificates. The Format Converter can use a BER to XML converter, e.g. from the IBM Tokyo Research Lab XML Security Suite [20] . The output of the BER to XML translator is an XER (XML Encoding Rule) format, which describes the X.509 certificate in XML. The next converter extracts the PKIX-defined attributes from the certificate fields and extensions, and exposes them in the respective SAML elements for simpler, uniform access and processing (in the figure we showed only a few of the attributes, such as the Issuer Distinguished Name, the Subject element and an attribute containing the SubjectAltName). For another example, showing format conversion for SPKI certificate, see Figure 7 . Similar format converters can handle credentials extracted from databases, as PICS labels, XML documents or otherwise (e.g., proprietary formats, e.g. the one for DUNS records used by [3] , or HTML page).
The Semantic Converter
The second and last conversion step is the Semantic Converter. The purpose of this conversion is to convert a SAML credential into another CML credential in which the fields are now understandable by the relying party.
We give now some semantic converter examples. The first example is a user's email address. In an X509v3 certificate this field may appear in the subjectAltName field as an rfc822Name while in another XML signed document it may appear under some EMAIL tag. Without the semantic converter an application that wants to use the e-mail address will have to understand various credential formats. With the semantic conversion, the e-mail address appears in a fixed field, hence it easy to be used by an application.
Another example is an AC (Attribute Certificate), which describes a role of a user participating in a marketplace. One AA (Attribute Authority) may issue values 'buyer' and 'seller' in a field named 'role' while another AA may issue values 'customer' and 'vendor' in a field named 'member type'. The semantic converter converts these two formats into some common format known to the relying party so that both AC are mapped to the same field.
Another example is a Trust Policy engine as in the Trust Establishment toolkit [17] . The toolkit allows a company to define a policy for mapping users to roles based on credentials. The policy language is rule based and it filters credentials assuming that each credential has some known type field (e.g. a recommendation credential, a credit history credential etc). The semantic converter can be used to assign a type to each credential even if the credential does not come with a predefined type field.
A natural question is, why do we need this conversion. Why can't we decide on some profile for each type of credential? The answer is that it is hard to decide on some common format that is acceptable on every issuing authority. Moreover, many credentials are extracted from legacy databases or issued by existing authorities, and it is almost impossible to force common fields.
The reason we believe the semantic converter will achieve the desired interoperability between the various credential formats is since it converts credentials only for a specific relying party which defines the conversion rules for itself and it does not try to coordinate all the issuing authorities in the world.
The Semantic Converter Architecture
We expect that there would be many credential types, defined by different issuers for different reasons. We expect that some of these will become popular and therefore converters among them may become available. However, with a large and dynamic set of credential types, it is not reasonable to develop one program to convert any given credential to a common known credential type. Instead, the semantic converter manager has interface to multiple semantic converter modules, and uses the appropriate module for each conversion. See Figure 5 Each Semantic Converter Module (SCM) has to first register with the manager and has to implement some defined SPI (Service Provider Interface). On registration, the SCM informs the manager of which credential types does it know to accept as inputs, and which credential types does it know to generate as outputs. The manager constructs a graph representing known conversions, with the credential types as nodes, and an directed edge connecting from one credential types to another, when a converter from the first to the second is known. When a new SAML credential is given to the manager, the manager searches for the shortest path from the type of the given credential to any of the types known to the relying party, and invokes the corresponding Semantic Converter Modules.
Summary
We presented architecture for collecting and converting credentials, to simplify the usage of credentials by relying party applications. We have parts of the architecture already implemented as part of the Trust Establishment [17] toolkit while other elements still need to be developed. 
